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 1. Introduction 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that there are two main types of public 
intervention in broadband Internet access markets: those related to market power 
(regulation and competition policy) and those related to positive externalities (network 
externalities or impact on overall economic growth). The first of these two types of 
intervention is carried out in the United States by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and by the states, and in the European Union by the European 
Commission and the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of the member states. The 
third package of European directives on telecommunications created the Body of 
European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), a pan-European 
telecommunications regulator based on the coordination of NRAs. Policies related to 
the promotion of broadband through different combinations of subsidies and public 
investments (“industrial policies”) are mainly carried out at decentralized levels both in 
the US1 and in Europe. This is in contrast with countries that have achieved very high 
levels of broadband deployment, such as South Korea and Japan, which have promoted 
strong national policies to promote broadband penetration for many years (see Trillas, 
2008a). 
In this paper, we present both a theoretical model and an empirical estimation to 
analyse the interaction of regulation, industrial policy and jurisdictional allocation, and 
their impact on broadband deployment. Although central powers may be more focused, 
internalize the relevant territorial externalities and have a more balanced matching of 
instruments and objectives, decentralized powers – lacking regulatory specialization – 
may internalize local horizontal policy spillovers (such as the promotion of e-health and 
e-learning) and use a diversity of objectives as a commitment device in the presence of 
sunk investments. A significant part of the investments needed to deploy broadband is 
highly specific (for example, underground optical fibre) and its value for alternative 
uses is very low or close to zero. This commitment by local authorities may be reflected 
in a variety of policies, for instance, local powers may have incentives to help alleviate 
the collective action problem of the joint use of rights of way and other physical 
                                                 
1 At least until President Barack H. Obama initiated the promotion of broadband in his 2009 fiscal 
stimulus package. 
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infrastructures.2 This enhanced commitment, similar to that mentioned by Weingast 
(1995) in the so-called theory of market-preserving federalism, may counter-balance the 
temptation of local powers to make expropriating or confiscatory demands when 
managing the rights of way (see among others Troesken, 1996, and Neufeld, 2008,). 
The analysis of how policy intervention is organized in the vertical structure of 
government matters for historical, technological and political reasons. The history of 
network industries, including telecommunications, shows an evolution from an 
essentially local industry3 to an increasingly larger geographic market size that ran 
parallel to the increasing role of the state and federal levels (see Trillas, 2008b). Modern 
physical networks in telecommunications exhibit increasing returns to scale but require 
local rights of way. At the beginning of the twenty-first century all levels of government 
are active (through regulation, competition policy or “industrial policy”) in the 
broadband sector. The degree and nature of the involvement of each level of 
government are of great importance to telecommunications firms, which have lobbied 
exhaustively for the approval of the third package of European directives on 
telecommunications with the argument that increased regulatory harmonization and 
market integration will reduce the costs of European wide operators. 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to provide insights into the impact of policy 
centralization or decentralization on broadband penetration. For this purpose we first 
develop a theoretical framework to show the existing trade-off between the different 
spillovers internalized by each level of government: the central government 
(centralization) internalizes territorial spillovers while regional/local governments 
(decentralization) internalize policy spillovers. As a result, the empirical prediction of 
our model is that the impact of decentralization on network extension is ambiguous. In 
the empirical exercise, using data for OCDE and EU countries for the period 1999-
2006, we examine whether centralization is necessary to promote new 
                                                 
2 Local powers have a choice of either charging a high price (in monetary or other terms) for the use of 
rights of way or expediting procedures and minimizing the transaction and disruption costs of digging 
streets and of other collective infrastructures. Moreover, rights of way were the policy instrument that 
inaugurated regulation at the local level in the nineteenth century and it remains crucial in the 
telecommunication sector. 
3 Historically there has been a trend to move regulation up the vertical structure of government. Troesken 
(1996) analyzes the transition from local to state regulation in the US gas industry. Electricity and 
telecommunications also started being regulated at the local level but at the beginning of the 20th century 
it was moved to the state level. Yet there are still many instances of local intervention, and regulation is 
still mainly carried out at the state level, despite the creation of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in 1934 in the US and the increasing role played by the European Commission (EC) since the late 
20th century. 
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telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market. The existing 
literature, in the main, claims it is, but we find no support for this claim in our data. Our 
results show that indicators of national industrial policy are a weakly positive 
determinant of broadband deployment and that different measures of centralization are 
either irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband deployment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the two branches of the 
existing research to which this paper refers: the literature on the economics of 
federalism and the empirical literature on the determinants of broadband penetration. 
Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 contains the econometric model 
specification, the data set and the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. The economics of federalism and network industries 
The main arguments presented in the literature examining the economics of 
federalism are also applicable to network industries, as argued by Trillas (2008b).4 The 
Tiebout (1956) argument that jurisdictional competition may, under factor mobility and 
certain other conditions, select optimally differentiated policies was strengthened and 
applied to commitment for private investment by the market-preserving theory of 
Weingast (1995). Treisman (2007) provides casual evidence that infrastructures devoted 
to public utilities or local airports have been used by local authorities to compete for 
mobile capital. However, regulatory competition may also unleash undesirable 
phenomena such as “race to the bottom” or “beggar thy neighbour” policies; an 
example of the latter in the telecommunication sector is high termination rates for calls 
originating from other countries. Nevertheless, laboratory federalism and tailoring 
arguments can also be used to defend a role for local powers, although inter-
jurisdictional externalities, coordination and scale (at the product or administrative 
level) could tilt the balance in favour of central powers. 
Although geographic market definition, in the sense with which it is employed in 
competition policy, could in theory be used as a criterion to choose the optimal 
regulatory jurisdiction, the fact is that often market boundaries do not coincide with 
those of political jurisdictions. Under certain specific conditions, it is worth going 
beyond traditional political boundaries and organizing regulation by special districts, 
                                                 
4 The pros and cons of decentralization in competition policy are discussed in Budzinski (2006). 
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such as the PJM regional transmission organization5 or the NordPool wholesale market6 
in the case of electricity. 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argue that in the absence of significant inter-
jurisdictional externalities, the allocation of policies should depend not only on 
efficiency criteria, but also on the objective of promoting political participation. This 
would justify local policies (that do not necessarily promote economic efficiency) if 
they are approved with sufficient levels of participation and transparency. In the energy 
(gas and electricity) sector, Troesken (1996) and Neufeld (2008) argue that a key factor 
in moving regulation from the local to the state level was the inability of local powers to 
commit to acceptable rates of return for private investors. In particular, Neufeld (2008) 
shows that for US electricity regulation, quasi-rents due to specific investments were a 
more important determinant than monopoly rents in the decision to move from local to 
state regulation.7 Nonnenmacher (2001), however, argues that in the diffusion of the 
state regulation of the telegraph industry a cycle characterized by promotion followed 
by regulation was more important than quasi-rents considerations. 
More recently, several authors have applied contract theory models of asymmetric 
information to their analysis of the role of issues such as capture, commitment and 
contractual externalities in the centralized versus decentralized debate.8 These 
contributions focus on very specific regulatory and industrial structures, which makes it 
difficult to generalize their conclusions to more generic settings. They show, however, 
the potential of analyzing explicitly the incentives of policy makers at each level. Along 
these lines, Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) present and test a model of the political costs 
and benefits of regulation, where only communities with large populations are able to 
afford the fixed costs of specialized regulation. The authors find that below a certain 
population threshold it is not worthwhile incurring the fixed administrative and political 
costs of writing, passing and enforcing specific legislation for different policy areas. 
Nuechterlein and Weiser (2007), who interpret the evolution of telecommunications 
in the US after the 1996 Telecommunications Act as a (largely failed) exercise in 
cooperative federalism between the FCC and the states, claim that all levels of 
                                                 
5 This organization started in the states of Pennsylvania , New Jersey and Maryland, and then expanded to 
other US states. 
6 This is the electricity market organization of Scandinavian countries. 
7 Troesken (1996) reports that the vice-president of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company argued that 
under local regulation, corporations were “at the mercy of as pitiless a pack of howling destroyers, as 
would the lonely traveller on the Siberian steppes be against the gaunt and hungry wolves”. 
8 See Laffont and Pouyet (2004), Caillaud et al. (1994), Bardhan and Moockerjee (2006). 
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government are needed in modern telecommunications markets given that central 
powers may be overwhelmed by local problems or that they might not have the 
necessary information to regulate the market properly. 
However, some scholars such as Hoffinger (2003), Hahn et al. (2003), Lehr and 
Kiessling (1998) and Sun and Pelkmans (1995) take a very strong view against any sort 
of decentralized intervention in the telecommunications sector arguing that 
differentiated geographic regulation has enormous compliance costs for firms in terms 
of red tape and uncertainty. Hence, they defend the argument that centralization is the 
only way to liberalize telecommunications markets.9 In keeping with these arguments, 
central regulation in the sector should therefore be strengthened and should focus on 
those aspects that amount to clear externalities, for example: 
i) “Beggar thy neighbour” policies in roaming wholesale termination charges (but 
keeping a balance that avoids precluding any cross-jurisdictional commercial initiatives 
on the part of companies to reduce retail roaming rates). 
ii) Any policies that cause, what Sun and Pelkmans (1995) call, the “frontier 
effect”, namely the fact that equally costly products or services are more expensive 
when they cross a jurisdictional border than when they remain within the borders of a 
jurisdiction. More generally, legal barriers to entry should be eliminated and only 
structural barriers to entry should prevail in the long run, which implies helping to 
integrate those markets that are only impeded by legally separate jurisdictions. 
iii) Protectionist terms of access or licensing policies that entrench the position of 
local incumbents or which are equivalent to state aid in the promotion of the 
international competitiveness of local incumbents. Credible entrants are typically 
foreign incumbents and the temptation to adopt subtle methods to promote local 
incumbents is often hard to control when conventional checks against state aid operate. 
A contradictory position is reported by Brennan (2001) who, when analyzing 
disputes concerning the imposition of open access conditions on cable company 
mergers by local authorities in the US, argues that such authorities should be granted 
freedom to choose in local markets, even if they decide erroneously, along the lines of 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997). His only caveat is in line with the arguments presented by 
Troesken (1996), in the sense that there is a risk that local powers might hold up private 
                                                 
9 Without adopting such a strong point of view, Aubert and Laffont (2002) and Smith (2000) consider that 
telecommunications should be included on the list of industries that need to be regulated at the central 
level. 
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operators, and stresses that this is particularly true when these operators are earning 
rents at the national level. In this case, the risk of hold-ups at the local level imposes a 
negative externality on the rest of the country. Brennan (2001), however, stresses that in 
matters of local access the relevant markets are local, not national: “The issue at hand is 
not agreeing to a standard Internet protocol, but one of the structure of the local ISP 
market. Local officials presumably are both closer to the affected consumers and more 
knowledgeable regarding relevant market conditions than is the federal government. To 
the extent that the policy is based on alleviating problems created by monopolies in 
relevant markets, the policy choice and the risk of error should be a local prerogative, 
unless a wrong local choice will substantially reduce the value of Internet access 
elsewhere in the country.” 
Table 1 organizes the literature summarised up to this juncture in three dimensions. 
First generation arguments include those made before the emergence of contract theory. 
The arguments in italics are concerned with the structural conditions of markets, which 
have the virtue of providing a clearer guide than is provided by other arguments. It can 
also be seen from Table 1 that more recent arguments have tended to provide more 
ambiguous conclusions. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE> 
 
2.2. Empirics: decentralization and determinants of broadband penetration 
From an empirical point of view, few studies, to the best of our knowledge, have 
analysed, as we do, the impact of the jurisdictional allocation of regulation in network 
industries. Humplick and Estache (1995) look at the impact of different measures of 
decentralization on the performance of road investment, electricity and water without 
finding clear cut results.10  
For the telecommunications sector, Wallsten (2005) analyzes evidence of a variety 
of promotion policies in the US at the state and local levels and reaches the conclusion 
that it is unclear whether such policies solve any market failure. In accounting for 
broadband diffusion in the EU, Distaso et al. (2006) include as one of their control 
variables whether the control of rights of way is centralized at the country level (rather 
                                                 
10 It is not entirely clear what their dummy variable for spatial decentralization captures. That is, it is not 
clear if all relevant legislation and tariff setting is performed at a sub-central level. In this sense, we use 
standard variables in the decentralization literature, which allows us to account for the level of 
decentralization of the sample of countries under analysis. 
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than being in the hands of regional or local governments). In their discussion of the 
hypotheses forwarded, their expectation is that centralization will have a positive impact 
on deployment. The authors do not explain why they expect such an impact, they 
merely state that “one should expect less delay under centralized authority granting 
rights of way to broadband access providers”. Presumably they have in mind the 
implicit expectation that local powers may use the control of rights of way to extract 
onerous revenues from the operators. Their empirical result is that the centralized 
control of rights of way had a positive, but not significant, impact on broadband 
penetration between 2000 and 2003. 
Wallsten (2006), Gual and Jodar (2007), Waverman et al. (2007), Friederiszick et 
al. (2007) analyze the determinants of broadband penetration for developed countries 
using panel data techniques. All of them stress the importance of distinguishing between 
platform-based and access-based competition, but none of them explicitly uses 
decentralization or industrial policy regressors as we do in this study. 
Interesting case studies covered in Trillas (2008a) shed additional light on specific 
determinants of broadband penetration in countries such as Canada (geographical 
differentiation), Japan and Korea (subsidised networks), the UK (vertical separation 
with hybrid management of network) and the US (platform based competition without 
federal public intervention). On the existing evidence, any analysis focusing on new 
specific determinants of broadband penetration must use as control variables those that 
have proved significant in most other studies, including, GDP per capita, population 
density (mainly of urban areas), education level of the population, competition 
(distinguishing between platform-based or access-based) and the complementarity of 
goods. 
 
3. Theoretical framework: A broadband investment model 
We present a simple theoretical model of broadband investment to develop our 
intuitions on the impact of the centralization/decentralization of regulatory decisions on 
broadband deployment, and to provide a framework for the empirical estimations 
performed in the section that follows. 
In broadband markets, consumption at adequate levels of quality depends on 
specific investments by operators. The incentives of these operators to invest, however, 
depend, among other factors, on a vector of policies: regulation, competition policy, 
control of rights of way needed to deploy lines, subsidies and taxes. With the so-called 
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next generation networks, for example, connection speeds crucially depend on the 
number of fibre lines that reach households (fibre to the home); these fibre lines require 
expensive electronic equipment and also public works and access to buildings.11 
In our simple model, in the centralized case there is internalization of the network 
externalities present in the telecommunication sector whereas in the decentralized case 
policy spillovers are internalized. For instance, when deciding on broadband policy, the 
government takes into account not only market power objectives, but also objectives in 
fields such as e-health and e-learning. Moreover, in the latter case we assume that this 
diversity of policy objectives can be used as a commitment device to facilitate high 
investment. That is, local decision makers may be concerned about total surplus in the 
regulated market as well as about local development, inflation, security of supply, the 
welfare of particular firms, input providers or groups of consumers.12 To the extent that 
these objectives require high broadband investment, local government is able to commit 
itself not to expropriate investments. 
In our model there are two jurisdictions and potentially one central power that may 
take decisions that affect both jurisdictions. A regulatory policy ix  (with 2,1=i ) can be 
set locally ( Lix ) or centrally (
C
ix ). This must be interpreted as an index that summarizes 
a vector of prices (retail and access), subsidies and other policies (such as a lenient 
competition policy) that have a positive impact on the firm’s profits. If x1 = x2, policies 
are said to be uniform (centralized policies may be uniform or not and local policy 
makers may set policy at the same level in both jurisdictions). If Ci
L
i xx = , policies are 
said to be equivalent. Local and central decision makers have different objective 
functions. πi and υi are firms’ profits and consumer surplus in jurisdiction i, 
respectively. Moreover, we assume that no authority has commitment powers, so that 
investment is chosen by the firms before the (central or local) authority fixes the policy. 
In this sense, it is an incomplete contracts model. 
There is one central regulator that fixes Cix  as implementing a bargaining solution 
reached by firms and consumers where firms’ ex-post surplus is α times that of 
consumers. Parameter α > 0 measures the weight of the welfare of shareholders in the 
                                                 
11 In 2006, Japan had 7.8 million of fibre to the home lines, whereas the core EU countries (the UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands) had just 870.000 such lines. As a result, 
Japan had an average speed for downloading files of 63.6 megabits per second, whereas Spain, for 
example, had an average speed of 1.2 megabits per second. 
12 It is not that central governments are unconcerned by these issues, but it is implicitly assumed that they 
have specific instruments to deal with them, for instance, central banks for dealing with monetary policy. 
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central regulator’s objective function relative to that of consumers (a measure of capture 
of the regulated industry or a measure of the bargaining power of telecommunications 
operators). If α = 1, consumers and shareholders have the same bargaining power. As 
for the parameter α, note that different central governments may differ in their scope for 
capture and in their commitment to policies. For example, casual evidence suggests that 
the central level is more “capturable” by businesses in the US than it is in Europe, and 
that the EU Commission has recently developed relatively more pro-consumer policies 
and, therefore, has been less able to commit.13 In the US there is a quid pro quo between 
large firms and large political parties and, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has 
adopted a more pro-business stance (see the New York Times 03/16/2008).14 In sum, 
the central decision makers care about consumer and producer surpluses in the 
broadband market, giving different weights to each, with these weights varying across 
central jurisdictions. 
Local regulators care about their specific producers and consumers, as they do 
about various additional objectives (summarized by the variable Ωi). Hence, each of the 
two decentralized jurisdictions chooses its policy with the objective of maximizing total 
surplus in the regulated industry plus various other objectives with a weight θ common 
across jurisdictions: 
 
iii v Ω++ θπ ,     (1) 
 
subject to a firm’s participation constraint. The fact that θ > 0 at the local level but θ = 0 
at the central level can be endogenized with a version of the Mulligan and Shleifer 
(2005) model of the political costs and benefits of specialized regulation.15 
In this basic model, one firm in each jurisdiction decides, prior to governments 
fixing policy, an investment level (Ii) at a cost given by: 
 
                                                 
13 The reason might be that EU institutions are relatively new and still seek popular legitimacy. 
14 Moreover, many companies have a national scope in the US and most companies do not, at least as yet, 
have a European scope, and there are no effective pan-European political parties; so the institutions of 
supply and demand for political action are absent or only seminal in Europe. 
15 θ may also be interpreted as an inverse measure of the transaction costs of lobbying of interest groups 
other than consumers and shareholders (for example, the management of an incumbent firm that wants to 
maintain their position in case of a takeover). These transaction costs are assumed to be lower at the local 
level, because collective action problems are lower at this level, there is less policy specialization and the 
mandates of agencies are vaguer. As is sometimes said, at the local level all interested parties meet when 
they collect their children from the same school. 
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2
)(
2
i
i
IIC = .     (2) 
 
This investment has an impact on the demand function or consumer valuation (e.g., 
upgrading the network allows people to subscribe to highly valued broadband services 
due to increased download speed). In a unit demand framework firms’ profits are given 
by 
 
2
2
i
ii
Ix −=π ,     (3) 
 
while consumer surplus in jurisdiction 1 is given by 
 
1211 )( xtII −+=ν ,     (4) 
 
with 10 <≤ t  indicates a parameter reflecting the inter-jurisdictional externalities. This 
parameter captures the idea that the network in one jurisdiction may be of higher value 
to consumers when the neighbouring jurisdiction has a better network. These spillovers 
are both direct and indirect. Direct externalities refer to individuals of jurisdiction 1 
benefiting from a good network in the neighbouring jurisdiction, allowing them to 
contact more people, firms or organizations in this country. Indirect externalities refer to 
the individuals of jurisdiction 1 benefiting from a good network in the neighbouring 
jurisdiction by creating incentives for the development of enhanced applications which 
require a large market. 
Once we have the basic model set-up, we can solve it for the two cases of 
jurisdictional allocation of regulation in network industries. 
 
Case A: Central Regulation 
The solution )),(),,(( 21 tIxtIx
CC chosen by the central regulator implements an ex-
post bargaining game, as mentioned above. This solution is a function of the vector of 
firms’ investments I = (I1,I2), the externality parameter t, and α. So the important point 
is how investment and externalities relate to the ex-post central regulator’s objective 
11
function. The central regulator sets policy such that the ex-post surplus of producers is α 
times that of the consumers: 
 
( )( )∑ ∑∑ −+= CiiCi xtIx 1α .    (5) 
 
Therefore, under the simplifying assumption that central government policies across 
jurisdictions are uniform Eq. (5) can be rewritten as: 
 
( )
α
α
+
+= ∑∑ 1
1 tI
x iCi ,    (6) 
 
substituting this expression in Eq.(3), at the investment decision stage the firms 
maximize (assuming no discounting): 
 
2)1(2
)1( 2ii
i
ItI −+
+= ∑ α
απ ,     (7) 
 
and from the first order condition of the firms’ maximization problem we obtain: 
 
)1(2
)1(
α
α
+
+= tI Ci .     (8) 
 
Equilibrium investment increases with the level of spillovers (t) and (non-linearly) with 
the weight of producers in the central regulator’s objective function (α): 
 
0
)1(2
)1(
2 >+
+=∂
∂
αα
tI Ci .     (9) 
 
Case B: Local Regulation 
In this case, externalities (t) are not internalized and investment depends on the 
relationship between the other objectives of local governments (Ωi) and investment (Ii). 
Ex-post, the regulatory authority maximizes Eq. (1) for a given level of investment, i.e. 
it maximizes: 
12
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iLiijiiLiiLijiLi IxtIIIxxtIIx ,, Ω++=Ω+−++ θθ .  (10) 
 
For the comparison to be meaningful, local policies ( Lix ) and investment (Ii) must be 
related to profit and consumer surplus in the same way as in the central regulation case. 
So given that the same weight is attributed to consumer surplus and profits at the local 
level, and given the unit demand16 and the sunk nature of investments, the decentralized 
regulator actually sets policy to maximize its second objective or local policies, that can 
be defined as: 
 
( ) LiLiiiLii xxIIx −=Ω ln, γ ,    (11) 
 
where we assume a specific functional form for the additional local policy objectives, 
which depend on investment by regulated firms and the local regulatory policy of the 
broadband sector and the parameter γ that indicates the degree to which the combination 
of the regulatory policy and firms’ investment in broadband positively impact on the 
second objective of local regulators. The exact value of γ may depend on the maturity of 
the regulated industry or the appraisal of local economic development compared to the 
pressure to expropriate investments. Local policy makers may value firms’ investment 
in broadband (Ii) because it contributes to the second objective of local polices (Ωi).17 
Note that Eq. (11) is concave so that there is an interior optimal local policy 
compatible with this second local objective. Moreover, the specification of this other 
local policies or second local objective, may also be interpreted as the reduced form of a 
number of additional objectives: for example, a combination of promoting local firms 
and keeping a low local unemployment rate. Eq. (11) must be interpreted as the fact that 
for local government, the investment in broadband undertaken by telecommunications 
firms also promotes local economic growth, “human development” (e-health, e-
learning), political visibility of local politicians, etc. Moreover, telecommunications 
firms usually have strong cash flows (positively correlated with Lix ) that may be 
                                                 
16 So deadweight loss plays no role in this basic analysis. 
17 For instance, in Spain, it is quite common in some regions that the main shareholder in gas, water, 
highways and telecommunications is a large, influential non-profit savings bank that typically captures 
the deposits of a large proportion of that region’s population and which is involved in social and cultural 
activities as a result of its foundational objectives. Examples include “La Caixa” in Catalonia and 
“Cajastur” in Asturias. 
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necessary for “other” local objectives including employment, local development, 
international influence, etc.18 
Maximizing Eq. (10) taking into account Eq. (11) we obtain that the optimal 
regulatory policy in the decentralized case is: 
 
i
L
i Ix γ= ,      (12) 
 
given Eq. (12) the firm chooses investment to maximize its profits, that is, from Eq. (3) 
we obtain: 
 
2
2
i
ii
I
I −= γπ .      (13) 
 
Maximizing Eq. (13) the firms’ optimal solution yields γ=LiI  and, in equilibrium, 
2γ=Lix . To the extent that γ varies across jurisdictions, the local regulatory policy 
would vary across jurisdictions, although we assume γ to be constant across 
jurisdictions for simplicity. Then when α = 1, that is, when at the central level 
consumers and shareholders have the same bargaining power, we obtain that, 
 
C
i
L
i I
tI =+<=
4
1γ    if   14 −> γt     (14) 
 
That is, if inter-jurisdictional network externalities t are high enough relative to γ, 
central regulation achieves higher investment (ICi) than local regulation (ILi). Or, if we 
let α vary and fix the network externality at a given level, say 21=t , then central 
regulation achieves higher investment than local regulation if 
 
,
44
3 C
i
L
i II =+<= α
αγ     (15) 
 
                                                 
18 If a more intertemporal perspective is adopted, the fact that the second objective of local governments 
may change from time to time, because of global policies or the economic environment, introduces an 
additional level of volatility that may be absent at the central level owing to the more clearly focused 
objective function at this level. This would increase the costs of investment, reducing the relative 
attractiveness of the local regime. 
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which is the case when γ
γα 434−> , i.e., when the weight of firms’ profits in the central 
regulator’s objective function, α, is high enough relative to γ, the degree to which the 
combination of the regulatory policy and investment enter in the second objective 
function of local regulators as stated in Eq. (11). 
In general, the results from the model of firms’ investment in broadband depend on 
the values of the model’s parameters. A central solution is preferred (in terms of 
investment) if the weight of shareholders in the central regulator’s objective function 
relative to consumers is high enough. But the other objectives of decentralized 
governments may act as a commitment device in the presence of sunk investments.  
Moreover, if the regulatory policy is the control of rights of way then it is easy to 
see that the local powers will face a variety of (possibly conflicting) objectives. For 
example, network competition may be facilitated if different operators share the use of 
rights of way and other infrastructures cooperatively. In this case, there is a trade-off 
between the negative externalities produced by too much digging when the rights of 
way are not shared and local revenues which are maximized when different operators 
need different permits to dig up the streets. Local powers may help alleviate the 
collective action problem of the joint use of physical infrastructures, but they also have 
incentives to promote non-cooperation. 
Going beyond our model, the decentralized solution may be preferred, in terms of 
firms’ investment, if decentralized jurisdictions compete to attract private capital by 
investing in public infrastructure that complements these private investments.19 This 
may result in a higher level of infrastructure, provided that the initial conditions in the 
local jurisdictions are sufficiently homogeneous. Decentralization also makes it possible 
to use existing institutions (so that fixed administrative costs do not have to be 
duplicated) to differentiate regulation by geographic markets with different potential for 
platform based competition. 
Which case dominates, therefore, remains as the empirical question that we address 
in the following section. 
 
4. Empirical evidence: data and main results 
Based on our review of the literature presented in section 2, and on the predictions 
derived from the theoretical model presented in section 3, we hypothesize that, in 
                                                 
19 In line with Treisman (2007), we assume that public investment (financed with taxes) in infrastructure 
is a complement to mobile private capital. 
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general terms, broadband penetration Y (as a proxy for private investment in 
telecommunications) is explained by a measure of centralization of the country (C), an 
indicator of industrial policy (P) as a proxy for public policies devoted to foster 
broadband penetration, variables that depend on regulatory decisions (R) and other 
control variables (V) that can affect broadband deployment, that is, 
 
Y = F(C, P, R, V) + ε.     (16) 
 
The dependent variable Y in the regressions performed is a measure of broadband 
penetration, i.e., the percentage of the population with a broadband connection. For 
robustness, we also perform all the regressions using the percentage of households with 
broadband access (measure of broadband household penetration) as our dependent 
variable. The data for constructing both variables have been obtained from Point Topic 
Ltd. Global Broadband Statistics. 
The industrial policy variable used (SUBSIDIES) is calculated as government 
subsidies to private and public companies as a percentage of GDP (see Ades and di 
Tella, 1997) and is obtained from the World Competitiveness Yearbook for various 
years. We expect industrial policy to have a positive impact on broadband penetration in 
line, for instance, with the experience of leading countries such as Japan and Korea.20 
We use two proxies to account for the effect of centralization/decentralization on 
broadband penetration. The first variable is %CENTRAL_REV and is calculated as the 
share of total central government revenue with respect to total general (including 
central, state and local) government revenue. Data are obtained from the OECD 
National Accounts Vol. IV-General Government Accounts. The second variable used is 
ROW1. This is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 when rights of way and 
digging permits on public land are granted by a single central authority and 0 when 
rights of way are granted by local authorities. This is the same variable as that used by 
Distaso et al. (2006) but with more observations. As explained in the theoretical model, 
the expected effect of centralization is ambiguous. 
Our use of two proxies of centralization (which are quite different in nature) is in 
line with Treisman (2007) and Blume and Voigt (2008), who argue that it is important 
                                                 
20 Industrial policy may also facilitate some forms of corruption. See Ades and di Tella (1997) where 
investment levels depend on anticipated industrial policies and corruption. Even if industrial policy 
promotes broadband investment, it could be that it has an opportunity cost in terms of other sectors not 
receiving much-needed public funds or tax distortions. 
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to use the relevant notion of decentralization in specific contexts. In particular, it is 
important to distinguish between administrative centralization and political 
centralization. In the first case, as captured by our variable of central revenues, it is the 
volume of public funds administered at the central versus the local levels that is 
measured, regardless of whether local funds are administered or not by elected local 
policy makers. In the second case, it is the degree to which policy making is carried out 
by democratically and locally elected policy makers. Some countries may have 
administrative decentralization without political decentralization. Similarly, some 
countries may be highly decentralized in terms of taxation and expenditures as well as 
politically, but be highly centralized in terms of their regulatory policies.21 However, in 
line with Inman (2008), political decentralization may be correlated with administrative 
decentralization because elected local bodies are a commitment device for 
administrative decentralization and policy differentiation. This is confirmed by 
Treisman (2006) who reports that political federalism is positively correlated with the 
proportion of decentralized over total country revenues or expenditure. 
In our estimations, to the extent that public intervention in telecom markets is 
characterized by a multidimensional vector of policies, administrative centralization as 
captured by the proportion of central revenues may be a proxy for the overall degree of 
centralization of the relevant policies. However, to the extent that we focus on specific 
elements of this vector, the location of the control of local rights of way is the 
appropriate measure of centralization for this specific element. 
In line with the empirical literature on broadband penetration, we select two types 
of regulatory variable (R). The first are the measures of market concentration. On the 
one hand, HH-INTER accounts for the degree of concentration across platforms (inter-
platform competition) and is calculated using the standard Herfindhal index. On the 
other hand, HH-INTRA is also a Herfindhal index measuring the level of market 
competition within the DSL technological platform. In both cases we assume that 
regulators control these degrees of concentration through regulatory instruments. We 
expect higher degrees of concentration to be negatively related to broadband 
penetration, as less competition reduces output. The data for constructing both 
                                                 
21 For instance, in Spain public spending is fairly decentralized and there are strong democratically-
elected authorities at both local and regional levels, but the regulation of airports, electricity, 
telecommunications and (most) railways and ports is still centralized. 
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Herfindhal indices have been obtained from Point Topic Ltd. Global Broadband 
Statistics. 
Second, we also use as proxies for regulatory policies measures accounting for 
unbundling regulation: FULL_UNBUND is a dichotomous variable taking 1 when full 
unbundling is mandatory (0 otherwise), and SUBLOOP is a dichotomous variable 
taking 1 when subloop unbundling access is mandatory (0 otherwise). Both variables 
are obtained from the OECD (2003): Developments in Local Loop Unbundling. LLP is 
the price of a leased line calculated by adding the one-off to the annual charge of 2km 
of 2Mbps leased line, as in Distaso et al. (2006). This variable has been obtained from 
the EU reports on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package 
(2000-2006) and is only available for EU countries. 
As control (demographic) variables we use GDP PER CAPITA in purchasing power 
parity terms (under the assumption that broadband is a normal good) from the 
International Monetary Fund (robustness checks have been performed with GDP per 
capita from the AMECO database from EUROSTAT). Population DENSITY (under the 
assumption that higher density countries have a lower deployment cost) is obtained as 
population per square kilometre (both from IMF databases).22 
To empirically estimate Eq. (16) we have constructed a dataset for 29 OECD 
countries between 1999 and 2006. Our data contain information for Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel owing to the 
difficulties in obtaining data for all the variables used. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the main results for OECD countries. More specifically, Table 
2 presents the fixed effects panel estimations, while Table 3 takes into account possible 
problems of endogeneity in the panel estimations and presents the results using the 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE> 
 
                                                 
22 It might be argued that what matters is the population density of the metropolitan areas. Unfortunately, 
we do not have data for this variable for all sample years and countries. 
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In our empirical framework, it could be argued that some of the regressors used in 
estimating Eq. (16) might be endogenous to broadband penetration. For instance, GDP 
per capita, the regulatory variables or the measure of public policy used could also be 
affected by the broadband penetration rate. To avoid this problem we use lag variables 
of the potential endogenous variables as instruments in our panel data framework. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE> 
 
In both tables, we estimate different models according to the variables introduced. 
The regulatory variables accounting for competition (HH-INTER and HH-INTRA) are, 
in general, statistically significant and show a negative sign. The variables introduced to 
account for the existence of unbundling regulation perform differently. 
FULL_UNBUND is positive and statistically significant, indicating that when full 
unbundling is mandatory there is higher broadband penetration as we would expect 
from a third-party access regulation of this type. The variable SUBLOOP is not 
statistically significant in the various models estimated. 
The control variables that account for the demographics of each country have the 
expected signs and are in most cases statistically significant. The proxy for industrial 
policies (SUBSIDIES) is not statistically significant, although its t-ratio increases when 
we instrument it (see Table 3), and in all the estimations performed it presents a positive 
sign. The degree of centralization, measured as the share of central government revenue 
- our main variable of interest (%CENTRAL_REV) - presents a negative and statistically 
significant effect on broadband penetration in Table 2, while its effect becomes 
statistically insignificant in Table 3 (albeit maintaining its negative sign). Thus, it would 
seem that centralization might negatively affect broadband penetration. As previously 
argued, however, our measure of centralization might be considered too general and, as 
such, be seen as being unrelated to broadband. 
In line with Treisman (2007), we use a more specific variable to account for the 
centralization/decentralization of regulatory decisions in the broadband sector. In order 
to do this we restrict our estimations to countries within the European Union, for which 
we are able to use a decentralization variable that is specific to broadband policies: the 
centralization or otherwise of the control of rights of way, ROW1. This variable is the 
same as that used in Distaso et al. (2006), but in our case we include observations for 
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two more years. The estimations restricted to EU countries are presented in Table 4 
(fixed effects panel estimation) and Table 5 (IV-fixed effects panel estimation). 
Our results for the EU countries confirm those obtained for the whole sample of 
OECD countries. For the centralization variables, we obtain a negative and significant 
effect of %CENTRAL_REV, but a non significant effect for ROW1, rights of way and 
digging permits, although this variable presents a negative sign. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE> 
 
As for the centralization/decentralization issue, our results seem to suggest that the 
ability of local powers to solve the collective action problem of the joint use of physical 
broadband infrastructures, and the concern for negative externalities and social welfare, 
is of a greater weight than any short-term concern for maximizing confiscatory revenues 
and, hence, decentralization promotes investment in broadband. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE> 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented a joint analysis of both regulatory and industrial 
policies and government jurisdictional allocation as they affect the penetration of 
broadband Internet access. We constructed a theoretical model to develop intuitions 
regarding the effect of centralization/decentralization on broadband investment. In the 
empirical exercise we examined whether centralization/decentralization is necessary to 
promote new telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market. 
The existing literature, in the main, concludes it is, but we find no support for this claim 
in our data. More specifically, our results show that measures of centralization are either 
irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband deployment. As such, our evidence is 
inconsistent with the opinions expressed by a number of scholars against decentralizing 
telecommunications policies. 
Europe seems to be currently seeking to internalize its network externalities via a 
progressively more centralized regulation, whereas in the US geographical externalities 
are being internalized through large national (and, therefore, continental) firms that 
compete in a variety of product and geographic markets. 
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One could be tempted to argue that as some telecommunications markets become 
more and more inter-jurisdictional (and, hence, more and more global) in nature as a 
result of enhanced technology, market regulation and policy intervention should also 
cease to be local, regional and even national. However, long distance communications 
or backbone Internet networks are also potentially competitive in nature, much more so 
than local communications. The regulation of telecommunications is being increasingly 
relegated to matters of local access and bottlenecks are predominantly local. Here it is 
worth highlighting the differences with electricity markets, in which long distance 
transmission is a natural monopoly that has to be regulated at the highest possible level. 
Deregulation in the US and Europe has required centralized initiatives because 
entrenched monopolies have tended to be national, but this does not necessarily imply 
that any remaining or new regulations or policy interventions should be introduced 
centrally. The need for vertical and horizontal cooperation (discussed in Baron’s, 1985, 
seminal contribution) is often seen in network industries. Administrative costs and 
distributional concerns, of course, make inter-jurisdictional cooperation difficult. 
However, differentiated regulation and geographically tailored policies might be 
required as local governments may have better commitment and other collective action 
abilities, and also because of the reasons forwarded for many years in the fiscal 
federalism literature: principally, that is, to take into account differences in collective 
preferences, costs and consumer demand, and to promote policy experimentation in the 
face of uncertainty. This uncertainty may be due to technological or demand unknowns 
or to experts disagreeing on what constitutes the best policy option. For example, in 
broadband markets, scholars hold different opinions23 as to the best way to promote 
competition: either through facilities-based, vertically integrated rivalry or through a 
“ladder of investment” by which entrants are initially helped by regulators to use the 
infrastructure of the incumbent, and are progressively encouraged to build their own 
infrastructure. 
The trend in Europe has been to strengthen the regulatory role of the European 
Commission and to create national (member state) independent regulatory agencies, 
with little consideration being given to the need to accommodate some degree of local 
or regional power and to coordinate such regulation with other policies. We claim that 
discussions of regulatory federalism should be the object of more research, especially as 
                                                 
23 See Trillas (2008a) for a summary of this debate. 
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Europe has recently created a Pan-European regulator in its third package of European 
directives on telecommunications. 
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Table 1: Summary of arguments: the link between federalism and network industries 
 Favours Central 
Regulation 
Favours Local 
Regulation 
Ambiguous 
First  
Generation 
-Externalities and scale 
-Coordination 
-Race to the bottom 
-Beggar thy neighbour 
-Laboratory federalism 
-Tailoring 
-Regulatory Competition 
-Market definition 
-Special districts 
Second 
Generation 
 
-Quasi-rents 
-Compliance costs 
-Regulatory capacity 
-Market preserving 
federalism 
-Political participation 
-Accountability 
-Contractual issues 
-Capture 
-Commitment 
Source: authors’ own. 
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Table 2. Fixed effects panel estimations for OECD countries. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant -54.958 (-3.49)*** 
-64.324 
(-3.90)*** 
-63.653 
(-5.23)*** 
-75.367 
(-6.33)*** 
-108.76 
(-4.66)*** 
-82.267 
(-5.36)*** 
-88.787 
(-3.79)*** 
-69.632 
(-4.71)*** 
-192.79 
(-4.62)*** 
Demographics          
GDPpc 0.0004 (6.57)*** 
0.0005 
(8.53)*** 
0.0004 
(6.53)*** 
0.0006 
(9.55)*** 
0.0011 
(6.63)*** 
0.0006 
(9.80)*** 
0.0010 
(5.43)*** 
0.0005 
(8.23)*** 
0.0014 
(5.08)*** 
Density 313.91 (2.45)*** 
359.92 
(2.75)*** 
369.59 
(3.91)*** 
404.67 
(3.89)*** 
536.39 
(2.789)*** 
503.484 
(4.40)*** 
428.58 
(2.15)** 
425.73 
(3.62)*** 
1251.9 
(3.26)*** 
Competition          
HH-inter -0.693 (-0.41) 
-4.312 
(-3.69)*** --.-- -.- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
3.485 
(0.86) 
HH-intra -3.463 (-2.56)** --.-- 
-4.005 
(-4.39)*** -.- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
-2.534 
(-0.73) 
Unbund regulation          
Full unbund -.- -.- -.- 1.993 (3.78)*** --.-- --.-- 
0.915 
(1.29) 
2.001 
(3.62)*** --.-- 
Subloop -.- -.- -.- -1.343 (-0.51) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Public policies          
Subsidies -.- -.- -.- -.- 12.508 (0.645) --.-- 
13.111 
(0.49) --.-- 
22.853 
(0.43) 
Decentralization          
%Cent revenue -.- -.- -.- -.-  -19.364 (-2.90)*** --.-- 
-14.884 
(2.27)** 
18.617 
(1.36) 
N  186 195 186 224 140 208 135 200 71 
Countries 29 29 29 28 29 27 28 26 15 
R2 within 0.6522 0.6691 0.6826 0.6803 0.6560 0.6522 0.5351 0.6768 0.7433 
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage population of broadband penetration, i.e., total number of broadband subscribers/total population (source: Point Topic Ltd.). We 
use a logit transformation of the dependent variable ln(y/1-y). Results are robust to the use, as dependent variable, of the percentage of broadband household penetration (total 
number of broadband subscribers/total number of households). Full time period is 1999-2006 although the panel is unbalanced. No time effects used. 
 
26
 
Table 3. IV Fixed effects panel estimations for OECD countries. 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Constant -76.355 (-4.70)*** 
-77.578 
(-4.77)***
-65.543 
(-5.51)***
-169.33 
(-5.24)***
171.46 
(-4.57)*** 
-154.19 
(-4.07)***
Demographics       
GDPpc 0.0004 (5.13)*** 
0.0004 
(6.00)*** 
0.0004 
(5.23)*** 
0.0014 
(5.57)*** 
0.0014 
(4.66)*** 
0.0013 
(3.85)***
Density 509.44 (3.70)*** 
537.66 
(3.74)*** 
435.70 
(4.20)*** 
916.91 
(3.41)*** 
884.88 
(3.16)*** 
824.89 
(2.82)***
Competition       
HH-inter 2.711 (1.33) 
-4.100 
(-3.55)*** -.- -.- -.- -.- 
HH-intra -5.971 (-3.61)*** -.- 
-3.754 
(-3.96)*** -.- -.- -.- 
Unbund regulation       
Full unbund -.- 2.374 (4.70)*** 
1.631 
(2.93)*** -.- -.- 
0.645 
(0.80) 
Subloop -.- -1.591 (-0.73) 
-2.080 
(-0.97) -.- -.- -.- 
Public policies       
Subsidies -.- -.- -.- 62.647 (1.39) 
64.010 
(1.37) 
67.575 
(1.43) 
Decentralization       
%Cent revenue -.- -.- -.- -.- -1.156 (-0.08) 
-0.509 
(-0.03) 
N  172 176 168 111 103 99 
Countries 29 28 28 29 27 26 
R2 within 0.6694 0.7305 0.7151 0.5924 0.5874 0.5841 
Endogenous 
variables 
GDPpc 
HH-inter 
HH-intra 
GDPpc 
HH-inter 
GDPpc 
HH-intra 
GDPpc 
Subsidies 
GDPpc 
Subsidies 
GDPpc 
Subsidies 
Note: see Table 2. 
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Table 4. Fixed effects panel estimations for EU countries. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant -91.053 (-4.52)*** 
-94.681 
(-4.46)*** 
-87.172 
(-4.52)*** 
-114.32 
(-5.91)*** 
-112.84 
(-2.9)*** 
-73.923 
(-3.87)*** 
-134.20 
(-6.42)*** 
-82.923 
(-3.70***) 
-74.944 
(-3.87***) 
Demographics          
GDPpc 0.0002 (3.00)*** 
0.0004 
(5.09)*** 
0.0003 
(3.11)*** 
0.0003 
(2.60)*** 
0.0008 
(3.94)*** 
0.0006 
(7.45)*** 
0.0004 
(4.28)*** 
0.0004 
(5.11)*** 
0.0003 
(4.06)*** 
Density 547.56 (3.79)*** 
538.06 
(3.58)*** 
522.79 
(3.74)*** 
704.01 
(4.62)**** 
572.75 
(1.97)* 
444.51 
(3.18)*** 
767.33 
(5.12)*** 
505.42 
(3.34)*** 
478.94 
(3.30)*** 
Competition          
HH-inter 1.399 (0.70) 
-2.810 
(-2.17)** -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 
-2.382 
(-1.80)* 
-2.972 
(-2.54)** 
HH-intra -4.247 (-2.69)*** -.- 
-3.368 
(-3.49)*** -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- --.-- 
Unbund regulation          
Full unbund -.- -.- -.- 2.106 (3.37)*** -.- -.- -.- -.- 
2.649 
(4.84)*** 
Llp -.- -.- -.- -0.008 (-0.43) -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 
Public policies          
Subsidies -.- -.- -.- -.- 14.166 (0.50) -.- -.- -.- -.- 
Decentralization          
%Cent revenue -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -22.862 (-3.27)*** -.- 
-12.397 
(-1.71)*** 
-4.963 
(0.433) 
Row1 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- --.-- -1.755 (-1.40) -.- -.- 
N  111 118 111 112 91 150 120 117 109 
Countries 19 19 19 14 19 19 15 19 18 
R2 within 0.6699 0.6824 0.6681 0.7291 0.4677 0.6648 0.6983 0.6884 0.7593 
Note: see Table 2. 
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Table 5. IV Fixed effects panel estimations for EU countries. 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Constant -105.65 (-5.03)*** 
-92.893 
(-4.63)***
-148.72 
(-2.91)***
-104.69 
(-2.65)***
-144.61 
(-2.80)*** 
-154.19 
(-4.07)***
Demographics       
GDPpc 0.0002 (2.11)** 
0.0003 
(2.23)** 
0.003 
(3.86)*** 
0.0007 
(2.79)*** 
0.0011 
(2.94)*** 
0.0013 
(3.85)***
Density 653.64 (4.28)*** 
567.30 
(3.57)*** 
740.17 
(1.89)* 
641.80 
(2.12)** 
787.93 
(1.97)** 
824.89 
(2.82)***
Competition       
HH-inter 3.940 (1.59) -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 
HH-intra -6.185 (-3.04)*** 
-2.303 
(-1.96)** -.- -.- -.- -.- 
Unbund regulation       
Full unbund -.- 2.585 (4.05)*** -.- -.- -.- 
0.645 
(0.80) 
Llp -.- 0.021 (1.16) -.- -.- -.- -.- 
Public policies       
Subsidies -.- -.- 65.968 (1.27) 
15.812 
(0.55) 
66.376 
(1.27) 
65.575 
(1.43) 
Decentralization       
%Cent revenue -.- -.- -.- -22.776 (-1.67)* 
-11.146 
(-0.71) 
-0.509 
(-0.03) 
N  100 81 72 89 72 99 
Countries 19 15 19 19 19 26 
R2 within 0.6858 0.7502 0.5372 0.4912 0.5419 0.5841 
Endogenous 
variables 
GDPpc 
HH-inter 
HH-intra 
GDPpc 
HH-intra 
GDPpc 
Subsidies GDPpc 
GDPpc 
Subsidies 
GDPpc 
Subsidies 
Note: see Table 2. 
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